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Abstract 
This paper aims to identify the impediments to the development of the renewable energy sector 
in Kazakhstan through the lens of governance by drawing on the definition of governance as 
the execution of policy. The paper investigates the execution of the nation’s policy on 
renewables by looking into the investment process, and provides an assessment of governance 
quality based on the interplay between state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy. 
Critical impediments to investment in renewables include the multiplicity of provisions 
and agencies involved; the unstructured and ineffectual relations between renewable energy 
producers and operators; the ineffectual governance structures and mechanisms; the 
inconsistent development of the legal and regulatory framework; and the uncertainty regarding 
the resolution of legal disputes. Assessment of each of these indicates a very high degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy and limited state capacity, which, complemented by continuous 
dominance of the oil and gas sector, significantly impedes the government’s attempts to expand 
the renewable energy sector. As reliance on oil and oil revenue continues, in the long term the 
nation’s energy security is jeopardised. The paper contributes to knowledge by enhancing the 
understanding of governance of the renewables sector and providing insights into ways to 
facilitate investment. 
Keywords: renewable energy, governance, bureaucratic autonomy, state capacity, Kazakhstan 
1. Introduction
Kazakhstan is a resource-rich country both in traditional and renewable energy sources.  
However, much like other resource-rich countries, Kazakhstan is facing rapidly depleting 
reserves of fossil fuels, a natural resource of strategic importance for both its energy security 
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and its sustainable economic development. Furthermore, despite its impressive economic 
growth since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, in recent years Kazakhstan 
experienced a series of economic downturns resulting from falling oil prices. It has therefore 
been increasingly interested in energy generation from renewable sources with the dual goal of 
future energy security and economic durability.  
Kazakhstan’s reliance on fossil fuels and oil in particular, due to their role as a principal 
source of energy and a critical source of budget revenue, has created path dependency, with the 
existing fossil fuel based energy sector impeding the development of renewables. Furthermore, 
the diversification of the nation’s economy and its sustainability are compromised. The 
traditional energy sector is well established, it represents significant vested interests, and is 
supported by a strong lobby. Meanwhile the renewables sector is underdeveloped, with many 
elements (such as upstream and downstream supply chains, tariffs, qualified staff) yet to be 
established and institutionalised. Key institutions have competing visions on the nation’s 
energy future (Asian Development Bank, 2010), and the two sectors -within the broader energy 
field- compete with, rather than collaborate and complement, each other. This is despite the 
nation’s stated focus on renewable energy sources (RES) and significant efforts to promote the 
utilisation of renewables. The historically formed dominance of the traditional energy sector 
has led to the RES sector lagging behind, requiring systematic governmental support and 
focused efforts in the form of governance structures and mechanisms, macro-level projects, 
subsidies and incentives. If Kazakhstan is to be successful in addressing the entrenched 
distinction between the two sectors and achieving its goals of energy security and sustainable 
economic development, it is crucial that utilisation of renewables significantly expands. 
This paper aims to investigate the impediments to the development of the RES sector 
from the governance perspective, focusing on the investment process in RES projects 
(henceforth the investment process). We explore the investment process as it emerges from the 
legal and regulatory provisions governing the RES sector. The legal and regulatory framework 
underpinning the investment process is a key element of the sector’s governance and vital for 
its growth. Specifically, the research question is what are the critical impediments to the RES 
sector governance in the context of the investment process that hinder the development of the 
sector and the greater penetration of RES in the nation, in view of the government’s stated 
commitment and significant efforts in that direction. 
The paper’s aim stems from the current condition of the RES sector in Kazakhstan. 
Over more than ten years (since 2006), Kazakhstan has been undertaking actions attempting to 
develop policy, form the legal and regulatory framework, set up structures and institutions, 
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organise financing, launch production facilities and develop energy generation from 
renewables. Whilst certain achievements have been made (to be discussed in a separate section 
below), progress has been limited and non-governmental investment is virtually non-existent. 
Moreover, certain governance elements appear to have been ineffectual and in some cases 
counter-productive, indicating a lack of forethought on their suitability and fitness-for-purpose. 
This explains the need to identify and assess impediments to investment in the RES sector, 
particularly in light of the sector’s potential for development both in terms of the economic 
viability of renewable resource exploitation and of the existence of certain governance 
elements (such as regulatory bodies and industry associations).  Whilst the dominance of the 
oil sector presents one set of barriers, it would be naïve and inadequate to associate all problems 
with the development of the RES sector merely with the nation’s dependency on fossil fuels. 
Identifying the impediments to effective governance in the context of investment in the sector 
might therefore give valuable insights into how to enhance and accelerate investment in the 
sector and hence drive its expansion, which explains the significance of the study. Identification 
of impediments is the first step in understanding the future of the sector, which naturally should 
be followed by exploring ways to resolve governance problems. This however is beyond the 
scope of this paper.    
  The paper begins by outlining the approach and methodology adopted in this study. It 
then describes governance elements underpinning the investment process, and summarises key 
policy developments, outlines legal and regulatory provisions and details the investment 
process. The paper then critically reviews the stages of the investment process from the 
governance perspective, identifying impediments. It concludes by drawing insights into the 
implications of these impediments for potential investors, policy and governance of the RES 
sector and more broadly for Kazakhstan’s energy security and sustainable economic 
development.  
  
2. Approach and methodology  
 
This paper draws on the theoretical insights into governance provided by Francis Fukuyama in 
his seminal text (Fukuyama, 2013). Governance is defined as ‘a government’s ability to make 
and enforce rules, and to deliver services regardless of whether that government is democratic 
or not’ (Fukuyama 2013, p. 350). This paper adopts the view that governance focuses on 
execution (Fukuyama, 2013). Drawing on execution as the governance’ core, the paper does 
not examine Kazakhstan’s policy agenda for an increased utilisation of RES. Rather, it aims to 
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identify impediments to the execution of the nation’s policy on RES by looking into the 
investment process as underpinned by the legal and regulatory framework for the sector. The 
argument is that this process is one of the governance elements of the sector, with a very high 
significance for the sector’s expansion.   
Further, the paper draws on Fukuyama’s proposed approach for evaluating the quality 
of governance. He proposed a framework focusing on the interaction between state capacity 
and bureaucratic autonomy (Fukuyama, 2013). For the purpose of this paper, we operationalise 
the definition of state capacity as the ability of the state to effectively implement goals in three 
areas: delivering services, managing the public sector, and influencing the economic and social 
behaviour of agents (individuals, firms, institutions). Bureaucratic autonomy refers to the 
degree of discretion that government officials possess. This degree is determined by the rules 
and regulations that guide (and/or frame) the work of bureaucrats. The foundation of these rules 
is accountability, the principles and boundaries of which are set by the government, although 
there might be a mismatch between the stated accountability (formal rules) and how it is 
managed in practice. In this paper, the adopted conceptual approach is useful as it serves well 
the research aim, i.e. permits to identify impediments to the implementation of Kazakhstan’s 
RES policy and make their qualitative assessment through the prism of governance.     
Data collection for this study was undertaken in Kazakhstan over 18 months in 2016-
17. To capture the complexity of governance in the RES sector, 18 semi-structured interviews 
ranging from 30 to 90 minutes in duration were conducted. Interviewees -all Kazakhstani 
residents- were selected using purposive and snowball sampling (Heckathorn, 1997) and 
included: (a) government experts working in the RES sector; (b) senior managers of private 
RES companies; and (c) academics (at various levels). The principal criterion for selecting an 
interviewee was whether a person possesses an expert level of knowledge of the conditions and 
challenges in the sector. Although the sample size was small, the study reached data saturation, 
confirmed by the final round of interviews, with additional interviews providing almost no new 
data, and comments and opinions highly similar to those from interviews conducted earlier. 
Interview data were complemented by content analysis of policy documents, laws, government 
statements and other written materials that capture the development of Kazakhstan’s RES 
sector (Bernard and Ryan, 2010).  
Data analysis was driven by the emanating data themes and the chosen approach. The 
frequently noted and dominant themes -and the secondary topics or sub-themes in each- 
emerging from the raw interview data were identified and shaped by the adopted governance 
perspective (Saldana, 2009; Guest et al, 2012). The items in each theme and sub-theme were 
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prioritised based on the interviewees’ opinions (Saldana, 2009). This allowed capturing 
common patterns, shared concerns and trends related to governance in the RES sector (Thomas, 
2006). Thematic analysis of qualitative data was most appropriate for this study as it permitted 
the well-structured and systematic, owing to the adopted approach, treatment of data, and 
successfully served the study’s aim to identify barriers to the effective governance of the RES 
sector with particular focus on the investment process (Bernard and Ryan, 2010).      
 
3. Governance elements of the RES sector: Kazakhstan’s progress to date  
 
This section provides an account of the steps Kazakhstan has been making in establishing and 
strengthening the RES sector, which is necessary for an assessment of governance and 
specifically impediments to investment in the next section. It begins by highlighting 
Kazakhstan’s dependency on fossil fuels despite its wealth in renewable natural resources. It 
then discusses the evolution of the country’s policy direction and agenda for the sector and the 
development of the legal and regulatory framework for RES. Finally, it outlines the process an 
investor has to follow for launching a RES energy-generating plant, from conception to 
commissioning.     
 
3.1 Energy profile 
 
Kazakhstan is a resource-rich country in terms of non-renewable (oil, gas, coal, uranium) and 
renewable (wind, solar, biomass, hydro, geothermal) energy sources and ranks amongst the 
largest energy producers in Central Asia (International Energy Agency, 2015). The country’s 
potential for utilising RES is significant, estimated at over 1 trillion kWh/year, with power 
generation from wind and solar resources considered both technically and economically viable 
(Energy Chapter Secretariat, 2013; REEEP, 2014). Nonetheless, as Table 1 shows, the 
country’s energy generation is dominated by fossil fuels. 
 
Table 1. Power generation in Kazakhstan by source (%) 
 2015 2016 
Fossil fuels 81.6 79.4 
Hydro 10.2 12.3 
Gas turbine 8.0 7.9 
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Solar and wind 0.2 0.4 
Total 100 100 
Source: Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC), 2017. 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Legal and regulatory framework 
 
Recognising the need to limit its reliance on exhaustible resources and reduce its fiscal 
vulnerability to oil market fluctuations, since 2006 Kazakhstan has been making efforts to 
transition to a more sustainable economic model. Key policy instruments aiming to achieve 
steady economic growth and ensure energy security by developing the RES sector include: the 
Sustainable Development Concept (Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(RK) on the Concept of transition of the RK to sustainable development, 2006); the Kazakhstan 
2050 Strategy (Kazakhstan 2050, 2012); and the ‘Green Economy’ Concept (Decree of the 
President of the RK on the Concept of transition of the RK to ‘green economy’, 2013). 
Alongside with outlining a policy framework, Kazakhstan has been developing a legal 
framework to support its policy actions for growing and strengthening the RES sector. A host 
of legislative1 and regulatory provisions2 govern the power sector including RES. In addition, 
the Law of the RK on Support of the Use of Renewable Energy Sources, henceforth the Law 
on RES (2009; adopted in 2009, amended in 2013), provides the foundations for the legal 
framework and support mechanisms for increasing the utilisation of RES through a number of 
stipulations including: 
• Regional authorities are charged with the responsibility to allocate land plots for 
the construction of facilities using RES (amendment of Article 90 of the Land 
Code, 2003); 
• Regional power grid/transmission companies are charged with the responsibility 
and have the obligation of connecting RES energy-generating facilities to the grid; 
• Electricity generated from RES is to be bought at fixed feed-in-tariffs (FiT) that 
entered into force in June 2014 and are guaranteed by the government for 15 years; 
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• Producers of renewable energy are exempt from payments for power transmission 
services (although this might change should the Law on Land Economy be 
introduced (International Finance Corporation, 2015)); 
• KEGOC (Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company) was assigned the task 
of establishing the Financial Settlement Centre for Support to Renewable Energy 
Sources LLP (FSC) to be responsible for the centralised purchase and sale of all 
electricity produced by RES facilities and supplied to electric networks in 
Kazakhstan’s Unified Power System3 (traditional resource energy producers); 
• Traditional resource energy producers are obliged to purchase all the energy 
generated by RES facilities, via the FSC. This means that traditional energy 
producers have been assigned the role of an intermediary between RES producers 
and end-users. 
 
These provisions were further strengthened by the Law of the RK on Amendments and 
Addenda to Some Legislative Acts of the RK on the transition of the RK to a ‘green economy’ 
(2016), which came into effect on 1 July 2016.  Its provisions regarding the electric power 
industry include: 
• Adoption of the annual indexation of the feed-in-tariffs for electricity generated 
from RES to reflect exchange rate fluctuations between the national currency and 
major foreign currencies.  
• Consideration, when determining maximum consumer tariffs, of the cost of 
electricity produced by RES energy producers and purchased from the FSC by 
traditional resource energy producers. 
• Endowment of the FSC with a reserve fund to be used to cover its cash deficits and 
debts to RES energy producers stemming from non- or delayed payment for 
electricity supplied by them -through FSC- to traditional resource energy producers. 
 
3.3 The investment process 
 
The Kazakhstani government has taken specific steps to underpin the implementation of its 
policy on RES. It has been working with international organisations (e.g. UNDP) and 
international financing institutions (e.g. the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD)) to align its policy instruments with international standards, develop the 
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legal and regulatory framework governing the RES sector and reduce corruption. In addition, 
even before the adoption of the Law on RES (2009), there has been a host of implementation 
initiatives including state programmes, action plans, collaborative projects with international 
institutions and “raising awareness” activities. 
In 2015, the International Finance Corporation, in partnership with Kazakhstan’s 
Ministry of Energy and the Clean Technology Fund, published a guide for investors interested 
in undertaking a RES project in the country (International Finance Corporation, 2015). The 
guide outlines the investment process which has multiple, inter-linked stages -necessitating the 
involvement of numerous agencies- for the design, approval, construction and commissioning 
of energy producing plants from RES. An investor wishing to develop such a facility has to:     
1. Legalise the rights to a plot of land for the specific purpose;  
2. In the case of a hydro installation, obtain a water use permit;  
3. Arrange for the proposed facility’s connection to the grid through KEGOC or one of 
the regional network companies;  
4. Conduct a feasibility study, followed by preparation of the design documentation and 
cost estimates;  
5. Apply for the inclusion of the proposed facility in the list of energy generation 
companies using RES (held by the Ministry of Energy);  
6. Sign a Power Purchasing Agreement with the FSC;  
7. Construct the facility and connect it to the grid;  
8. Receive the Certificate of Acceptance following checks of conformity to construction 
regulations and the original design; and  
9. Commission the facility after online testing of the power plant.        
 
Figure 1 summarises the stages of the process, from project inception to plant commissioning, 
providing details of sub-stages, the number of government agencies involved and the estimated 
time required for completion.    
 
Figure 1. The investment process in RES projects 
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        Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
The investment process is dictated and governed by the legal and regulatory framework 
pertaining to the RES sector. However, despite the government’s stated aim to facilitate 
investment in it, this process presents a number of challenges for an investor. 
In the past 10 years, the Kazakhstani government has developed numerous policies 
providing direction, setting targets and undertaking specific initiatives in its quest to dissever 
its energy security and sustainable economic development from fossil fuels. It has further made 
significant progress in establishing the necessary regulatory and legal framework to underpin 
the development of renewables.  These efforts however have yet to show results: the RES sector 
is still in its infancy in comparison to the long- and well- established oil and gas sectors. This 
state of affairs suggests the existence of impediments to achieving the government’s aims. In 
an attempt to identify those barriers relating to the governance of the RES sector in Kazakhstan 
and in particular, to the governance of investment activities in it, the following section provides 
a critical analysis of the investment process. This will permit to assess relevant laws and 
regulations, the institutional context, and the supporting initiatives and mechanisms through 
the lens of governance.      
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4. Critical review of the investment process in RES projects in Kazakhstan 
 
Key elements of the investment process follow from the Law on RES (2009), which includes 
a number of provisions aiming at supporting the development of the RES sector. However, 
when critically reviewed, certain provisions emerge as impediments to investment in it and 
consequently to its expansion and the growth of the Kazakhstani economy. These impediments 
are:  
• Multiplicity of provisions and agencies; 
• Unstructured and ineffectual relations between RES producers and operators; 
• Ineffectual governance structures and mechanisms; 
• Inconsistent development of the legal and regulatory framework; and 
• Uncertainty regarding legal disputes. 
 
This section discusses these impediments through the lens of governance, i.e. an ability to 
deliver policy objectives. 
 
4.1 Multiplicity of provisions and agencies 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the investment process is complex involving multiple stages and requiring 
interaction with and input from numerous agencies at the local, regional and national levels. 
Underlying this process is a multiplicity of legal and regulatory provisions that an investor 
needs to adhere to and successfully navigate at each stage in order to progress to the next. The 
sheer number of stages and sub-stages, agencies and laws and regulations renders the process 
cumbersome and lengthy. Moreover, the existence of multiple laws and regulatory 
requirements, rather than a single coherent framework, presents a fragmentation of the legal 
and regulatory framework. This means an increased potential for overlap and duplication of 
the requirements to be satisfied and laws to adhere to by the investor, and of the effort required 
by both investors and agencies.  
In addition, the involvement of numerous institutions/agencies in administering the 
process and enforcing laws and regulations presents several inherent challenges: (1) 
unnecessarily complicated procedures; (2) lack of clarity and transparency; (3) dependence on 
inter- and intra- agency relations; and (4) obscure lines of communication. For example, at 
stage 1 of the process (legalisation of rights to a land plot), the investor is required to file an 
11 
 
application for the rights to a plot with the Local Executive Body. Two separate departments -
the Land Relations Department and the Department of Architecture and Municipal Planning- 
review it. Its approval requires the agreement of both. There is no information/clarity on: (1) 
which of the two Departments involved is the lead one; (2) whether and/or how the two 
Departments carrying out the review are in communication during the review process; (3) how 
they reach consensus and what happens if they disagree in their assessment of the application; 
(4) what is the investor’s line of recourse should the application be rejected by one or both 
Departments or (5) whether the investor would be informed of why, and by which Department, 
if the application was rejected. 
As one interviewee pointed out: ‘The regulatory framework makes difficult to attract 
investment…there are people with money but they are reluctant to invest as the rules are 
complicated…A big problem for foreign investors is knowing the system and the mentality’. 
In terms of time required from inception to commissioning, the completion of each 
stage requires significant (if at all known) time which in practice, for some stages, our 
interviewees confirmed is significantly longer than stated. Interviewees suggested that this is 
due to an attempt by these agencies to show ‘thorough examination of the documentation’ and 
hence demonstrate quality assurance and employ anti-corruption procedures. According to the 
experience of one interviewee: ‘When we applied for the approval of the Feasibility Study 
(stage 4 of the investment process) instead of 45 calendar days (as per stated timescale) the 
approval took 6 months. The agency requested the same details 4 times…Agencies hold on to 
the paperwork to show that they followed procedure and do a thorough review as it is 
fashionable to show that they are fighting corruption’. 
However, in reality, this is a significant disincentive for potential investors and it 
compares poorly with investment processes of other emerging and transitional markets with 
RES potential (International Finance Corporation, 2015), making entering the Kazakhstani 
energy market far less attractive for potential investors.   
Finally, successfully navigating through each stage and preparing the required 
documentation necessitates the services of licenced specialists and expert consultants. This 
means that significant expenditure and time resource commitment are required before the 
approval of the project, at the “pre-investment” stages (see Figure 1). Furthermore, our 
interviewees stated that some of the specialist companies do not actually have the required 
expertise and, hence, in their words, ‘the quality of documents provided (to investors) is 
substandard’. 
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To summarise, investors’ engagement with the multiplicity of legal and regulatory 
provisions and numerous agencies, with a requirement to commit to large upfront costs and 
significant time expense, forms the first set of impediments to investment in the RES sector.  
 
4.2 Unstructured and ineffectual relations between RES producers and operators 
 
Under the Law on RES (2009), RES facilities should be connected to the grid, whilst 
transmission of electricity from renewable sources should be free for producers of clean energy. 
However, the Law on RES fails to give clear guidance on the potential liability of electrical 
network operators and the system operator in case of their refusal or delay to (1) provide 
Technical Specifications to RES investors and/or (2) conclude the agreement for transmission 
services (Power Delivery Scheme) with them (Stage 3 of the investment process). In practice, 
the requirement of free network development and transmission services may lead to network 
operators being reluctant to provide their services to RES investors, or to lacking interest to 
conclude service agreements with them with no clear line of recourse open to investors. This 
is because both the development of the necessary connecting infrastructure and the 
transmission of power incurs an additional cost for network companies and the system operator.  
Moreover, there is no network connection agreement as such between the RES investor 
and the electrical network operator, making the Technical Specifications a “de facto contract” 
(International Finance Corporation, 2015). In this context, electricity producers can receive 
network access only by signing a contract for technical dispatch with the system operator, using 
a contract template that does not account for the nature of RES (International Finance 
Corporation, 2015).  
Essentially, RES investors are left to their own devices, whilst government support in 
the form of a clear, transparent and easy to follow procedure for becoming connected to the 
grid is missing. In addition, the incentives for network companies to provide the necessary 
infrastructure and for the system operator to transmit renewable energy are also missing. The 
situation RES investors find themselves in is further compounded by the lack of proper 
regulation of the relations between RES producers, network companies and the system 
operator: a network company can refuse to connect a RES facility or the system operator can 
refuse to transmit RES generated electricity without penalty.   
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4.3 Ineffectual governance structures and mechanisms 
 
The Kazakhstani government established the FSC as the sole buyer of electricity generated 
from RES. However, since its inception, its creditworthiness has been a concern for lenders 
and investors. As one interviewee highlighted: ‘International financial institutions, such as the 
International Finance Corporation, are scared to finance RES projects as the lack of a reserve 
fund means that if something goes wrong they have nothing to fall back to’. 
The FSC has relatively recently (July 2016) been endowed with a reserve fund; much 
later than its creation following the Law on RES in 2009. This meant that as a limited liability 
company, the FSC was not required by law to have a capital greater than USD 600, which could 
not cover its liabilities. The endowment of the reserve fund in 2016 is a positive step, but it is 
yet to be proven whether the measure will alleviate lenders’ and investors’ reservations 
regarding the FSC’s creditworthiness.  
This is of critical significance given the limitations that traditional energy producers 
face when they consider raising end-user tariffs to cover the cost of buying, from the FSC, 
electricity generated from RES. This might in turn lead to delays or non-payments to the FSC, 
which consequently might be unable to meet its obligations to renewable energy producers and 
potentially lead to its insolvency. Should this happen, clean energy producers will be left with 
debts that they cannot recoup and no buyer for the electricity they generate.   
A key governance mechanism put in place to regulate the RES sector is the list of 
eligible RES energy producers that Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy compiles. RES investors 
prior to starting plant construction are required to register on this list. However, there is no 
clearly established procedure and timeframe for an investor applying for inclusion in it. In 
addition, the law does not provide the criteria for assessing investors’ applications; in other 
words, it is left to the discretion of the Ministry of Energy officials, thus lacking transparency.  
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Ministry of Energy in practice applies an unofficial 
annual deadline for applications (15 November of each year) for inclusion in the list for the 
following year. The Investor Guide by the International Finance Cooperation (2015) states that 
the timescale for assessing and deciding on an application for inclusion in the list is 10 business 
days (International Finance Cooperation 2015, p. 14). In this study, the interviewees reported 
that, in their view, the number of RES energy producers to be included in the list has an 
unofficial annual cap. Interviewees further stated that certain organisations on the list do not 
have the necessary credentials and experience in the sector and that their inclusion was the 
outcome of a bureaucratic exercise rather than proper assessment. This means that a mechanism 
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designed to ensure the effective regulation of the RES sector is non-transparent, inept and 
counter-productive enabling the use of arbitrary judgement and hence fostering partiality and 
corrupt practices. Nonetheless, one interviewee pointed out that: ‘The list is necessary; 
otherwise there would be more bogus, unfeasible, substandard projects’. 
 
4.4 Inconsistent development of the legal and regulatory framework 
 
Although certain supporting mechanisms for the RES sector have been legislated for, their 
implementation through developing the necessary regulatory elements often has been 
significantly delayed. As one of our interviewees stated: ‘The government starts with pilot -
pet- projects and then thinks about regulation’. For example, feed-in-tariffs for electricity 
produced from RES were enshrined in law in 2009. However, it was not until 2015 when the 
Ministry of Energy approved the associated regulation (Point 9 of the Rules for Determining 
the Tariff for the Support of Renewable Energy Sources approved by the Order of the Minister 
of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 118, dated 20 February 2015). Likewise, the 
indexation of feed-in-tariffs for currency fluctuations has relatively recently been embedded in 
legislation (July 2016). Nonetheless, it is unclear whether the relevant mechanisms have been 
put in place in a timely fashion: one of our interviewees emphasised that the indexed tariffs 
were introduced as late as April 2017. This means that RES investors face an uncertain legal 
and regulatory environment and certain stages of the investment process are not supported by 
the necessary mechanisms.  
 
4.5 Uncertainty regarding the resolution of legal disputes 
 
Despite the rapid development of Kazakhstan’s legislative framework, it still does not embed 
some key legal concepts that need to be integrated in, for example, international corporate law 
(Law Gazette, 2013). Kazakhstan does not have bilateral treaties allowing judgements from 
Western European or North American courts to be enforceable in Kazakhstan. Similarly, 
Kazakhstan is not party to multilateral international treaties on enforcing foreign court 
judgements in the country. This creates a significant risk for foreign investors. Those who opt 
for contracts in which -despite the lack of enforceability- the governing law is not the 
Kazakhstani one, in case of a dispute face the non-enforceability of judgements. Those who 
opt for a contract using the Kazakhstani law as the governing law, face a number of challenges 
that might impact on a potential resolution. These challenges include the lack of clarity of the 
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Kazakhstani law; the limitations on the amount of damages and legal costs that can be awarded 
by a Kazakhstani court; the lack of experience of local judges in dealing with certain types of 
cases; and lower international recognition that Kazakhstani judgements carry as opposed to, 
for example, judgements from the UK courts. The country is now party to: the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958); the 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961); and the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965). 
Furthermore, Kazakhstan has a system of arbitration courts outwith the system of state courts.  
According to this system, if the parties in dispute have an arbitration agreement and one of 
them is not a resident of Kazakhstan, the dispute can be referred to the arbitration courts for 
resolution.  However, not all cases can be referred to arbitration (e.g. disputes involving 
immovable property in Kazakhstan) and an arbitration award has to be enforced by a 
Kazakhstani state court, which might not be happening in practice. This means that investors 
and particularly foreign investors face uncertainty -and hence significant risk- when it comes 
to the enforceability of arbitration awards and of judgements on contracts governed by other 
than the Kazakhstani law.  
 
5. Discussion: Assessing the governance of the RES sector 
 
The critical review of the investment process has identified five impediments relating to: the 
number of provisions and agencies involved; the relations between RES producers, network 
companies and the system operator; the existing governance structures and mechanisms; the 
development of the legal and regulatory framework; and the resolution of legal disputes. 
Considering each of these impediments, there is a noted lack of rules and regulations to 
guide and/or frame the work that bureaucrats - involved at each stage of the investment process 
- have to perform. This signifies extreme bureaucratic discretion, the existence of which may 
be linked to corruption (Meón and Sekkat, 2005). This finding is aligned with those in existing 
literature. With little or no accountability, a high degree of discretion may result in partiality, 
favouritism and corrupt practices (Klitgaard, 1988; Fukuyama, 2013) hindering investment 
(Meón and Sekkat, 2005). In contrast, strong accountability, free from partiality and corruption, 
is likely to encourage innovative behaviour of government staff (Fukuyama, 2013).  
A key feature of the Kazakhstani state is a high degree of political and fiscal 
centralisation, with the latter supporting the former (Bhuiyan and Amagoh, 2011). The 
investment process reflects this. It starts at the local level when an investor applies for the rights 
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to a land plot (stage 1 of the investment process) and it then moves on to the national level 
when an investor applies for inclusion in the list of approved RES producers (stage 6 of the 
investment process). In practice, this high degree of power centralisation means that, at the 
regional and local levels, bureaucrats have limited autonomy for strategic decisions (needing 
to consult with central government) and greater discretion for operational decisions (when the 
primary goal is to satisfy the principal, in the context of the principal-agent theory). As a 
consequence, accountability of bureaucrats at the regional and local levels is severely limited 
if at all in existence. The noted lack of rules and regulations in relation to the investment process 
exacerbates the already existing limited accountability.  
Moreover, all impediments point to the existence of numerous ineffective structures 
and processes, indicating that the government paid insufficient attention to the potential 
implications of governance elements whilst designing them in order to translate policy into 
action. The existence of ineffectual structures and processes inhibits the ability of the state to 
deliver clean energy to the public, manage public services efficiently, and influence the 
economic and social behaviours of investors and firms interested in the RES sector, and the 
institutions involved in its governance. These inefficiencies and impediments curtail the 
capacity of the state to deliver on its stated goals relating to the sector.  
Applying Fukuyama’s framework to the assessment of the quality of governance 
(Fukuyama, 2013), we conclude that the existing extreme bureaucratic autonomy and exhibited 
limited state capacity have had a negative impact on the Kazakhstani government’s efforts to 
achieve its policy objective, that is the expansion of the RES sector and the increase of the 
utilisation of renewable energy. This negative impact in delivering the desired outcome 
demonstrates the diminished efficacy of the governance of the RES sector with numerous 
implications for investors, lenders, the government and the nation to be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Table 2 summarises the impediments to the RES sector expansion. It further outlines the main 
points drawn from their assessment through the lens of effective governance and the 
implications that follow for investors, lenders, the government and the nation. 
 
Table 2. Summary of impediments: assessment through the lens of effective governance 
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Impediments Core issues 
Comments 
(these apply to each 
impediment) 
Implications 
(these result from all 
impediments) 
Multiplicity 
of provisions 
and agencies 
• Lengthy and cumbersome 
process and procedures. 
• Overlapping/duplicated 
requirements. 
• Overlapping and/or unclear 
responsibilities of agencies. 
• Lack of transparency and 
clarity. 
• Upfront costs for investors. 
• Lack of rules and 
regulations framing and 
guiding bureaucrats’ 
work signifies extreme 
bureaucratic discretion, 
which together with lack 
of accountability may 
result in partiality, 
favouritism and corrupt 
practices. 
• Ineffective structures 
and processes limit the 
state’s ability to 
influence the economic 
and social behaviour of 
individuals, firms and 
institutions in relation to 
RES. As such, they limit 
the state’s capacity to 
deliver the desired 
outcome. 
• Overall, extreme 
bureaucratic autonomy 
and limited state 
capacity have led to 
failure in achieving the 
stated objective, which 
is to increase the 
utilisation of RES.  
• Failure to deliver shows 
ineffective governance 
of the RES sector. 
For investors: 
• Disincentivisation.  
 
For lenders: 
• Reluctance to finance 
RES projects. 
 
For government: 
• Current governance 
structures and 
processes need to be 
revised. 
• The assessment of 
implications of 
governance elements 
should be incorporated 
in decisions regarding 
the design of 
governance structures 
and processes prior to 
implementation. 
• Particular attention 
needs to be paid to 
incentive measures for 
investors, network 
companies and the 
system operator. 
 
For the nation: 
• In the long term, 
energy security is 
jeopardised. 
• The diversification of 
the economy (related to 
the energy sector) is 
impeded. 
• Reliance on oil and gas 
revenues continues. 
Consequently, the 
budget remains 
vulnerable to oil price 
fluctuations. 
• Ultimately, the move to 
a more sustainable 
economic development 
model is hindered. 
Unstructured 
and 
ineffectual 
relations 
between RES 
producers and 
operators 
• Lack of incentives for network 
companies and the system 
operator to connect RES 
producers to the grid and 
transmit the energy they 
produce. 
• Additional costs (for network 
companies and system operator) 
to build the infrastructure 
connecting RES facilities and 
transmitting the energy they 
produce.  
• Contracts regulating relations 
between parties are missing. 
• Lack of penalties for non-
performance (e.g. if a network 
operator fails to provide the 
RES investor with Technical 
Specifications, Stage 3 of 
investment process). 
Ineffectual 
governance 
structures and 
mechanisms 
• The FSC struggles to establish 
its credibility as a reliable 
purchaser of clean energy, 
lacking creditworthiness. 
• Risk of unrecoverable debts and 
inability to sell electricity 
produced (for RES producers). 
• Unclear procedure for inclusion 
in the official list of approved 
RES energy producers. 
• Unclear timeframe for inclusion. 
• No assessment criteria for 
inclusion. 
Inconsistent 
development 
of legal and 
regulatory 
framework 
• Uncertain legal and regulatory 
environment. For example, often 
laws are not supported by the 
necessary regulatory provisions.  
• Lack of supporting mechanisms 
for certain stages of the 
investment process. 
Uncertainty 
regarding the 
resolution of 
legal disputes 
• Foreign investors face 
uncertainty regarding the 
enforcement of arbitration 
awards by Kazakhstani courts 
and the enforceability of 
judgements regarding contracts 
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in which the governing law is 
not the Kazakhstani one. 
• This presents significant risk for 
investors.  
                                         Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
Assessment of the investment process through the lens of governance has identified a 
lack of rules and regulations guiding the work of bureaucrats and the existence of ineffective 
structures and procedures. A number of plausible explanations could be offered. First, there is 
the historically established, undeniable dominance of the oil and gas sector. The sector has 
been playing a key role in the nation’s development to date and can be credited for its 
contribution to the rapid economic growth following the country’s independence from the 
Soviet Union in 1991. It represents important vested interests and is supported by a powerful 
lobby. Consequently, it has significant influence on the strategic direction of the nation’s 
energy and economic policies and on power holders and power brokers in government and 
regulatory bodies. This most likely accounts for the second plausible explanation, i.e. that there 
is disparity of views amongst key institutions (governmental and regulatory) as to the nation’s 
energy future and the path to sustainable economic development despite the recent focus on 
green economy with a number of key policy statements and legislative actions. Third, there is 
the lack of understanding and appreciation of the long-term implications of the rapid depletion 
of fossil fuel reserves, global climate change and increased air pollution, all placing an 
increasingly stronger emphasis on the need for utilising clean energy sources as well as 
increasing energy efficiency (Brown at al., 2001; Hanson and Laitner, 2004). Our interviewees 
highlighted this lack of understanding in the Kazakhstani populace, which has the widely held 
belief that oil is an inexhaustible resource. This is potentially coupled with a lack of political 
will to engage the community in a dialogue about the nation’s energy and economic future, and 
the importance of ensuring its long-term energy security and economic durability. This is likely 
to be true given Kazakhstan’s weak civil society, weak or non-existent NGOs and weak 
citizens’ engagement. 
There are numerous implications resulting from all impediments as Table 2 outlines. 
Key amongst those are implications for the government and implications for the nation. 
Given the number of problematic areas identified in relation to the current governance 
structures and processes, the government should focus on revising them, prioritising to tackle 
those with the potential for greater negative impact. Further, it should pay particular attention 
on devising incentive schemes for investors in the RES sector as well as network companies 
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and the system operator to attract the much-needed private investment. Finally, in decisions on 
the design of governance structures and processes, prior to implementation, the government 
should incorporate the assessment of their implications to ensure they will lead to the desired 
outcome.  
Limited progress in the development of the RES sector will lead to the continued 
dominance of the oil and gas sector with negative implications for the diversification of the 
economy related to the energy sector and the long-term energy security of the nation. It also 
means the continued reliance of the nation on oil and gas revenues and, consequently, the 
continued vulnerability of the budget to the volatility of oil price. Ultimately, this will inhibit 
Kazakhstan’s attempts to move to a more sustainable economic development model and will 
jeopardise its economic durability. 
Given Kazakhstan’s long-term commitment to renewables in its policy, one may expect 
more effective governance in the future. Whilst a green energy policy has already been adopted, 
greater attention to the design of governance structures, procedures and incentives could make 
substantial difference to the sector.  
 
Footnotes: 
1. Legislative provisions include: A presidential decree in 1995 establishing the current 
electricity market structure; the Programme of Privatisation and Restructuring of the 
Power Sector (Government Resolution No. 663, 1996); the Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (RK) about Energy Saving (December 25, 1997, No. 210-I); the Measures 
for Further Development of Market Relations in the Electric Power Industry of the RK 
(Government Resolution No. 190, 2004); the Law of the RK on Electric Power Industry 
(July 9, 2004, No. 588-II); the Law of the RK about Energy Saving and Increasing 
Energy Efficiency (January 13, 2012, No. 541-IV); the Law of the RK about Gas and 
Gas Supply (January 9, 2012, No 532-IV). Also, the Law of the RK about Architectural, 
Town Planning and Construction in the RK (2001, No. 242-II) and the Law of the RK 
about Subsoil Resources and Subsoil Use (June 24, 2010, No. 291-IV). 
2. Regulatory provisions include Grid Code Rules and Rules for: the organisation and 
operation of the wholesale and retail electric energy markets of the RK and the 
centralised electric energy trading in the RK; the access and provision of services to the 
retail electric energy market; the operation of the balancing of the electric energy 
market; and rendering services by the system operator and the operation of the system 
and ancillary services market (KEGOC, 2017).   
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3. Unified Power System: combination of power plants, transmission lines and 
substations. 
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